The Cold War and the New Rising Power (China)
An Unlikely Alliance
Because China was seen as such a major threat to both the United States and the Soviet Union, the president of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, had a discussion with the premier of the Soviet Union, Alexsei Kosygin, on Jun 23, 1967 where he stated to Kosygin that “China represented the very greatest danger to both countries at present, and that he did not want to do anything that would promote Chinese policy.” Kosygin responded that this was true and suggested that they discuss this issue more in-depth in a later meeting.[32]
As China was seen as the greatest threat by both the Soviet Union and the United States, the two superpowers of the world began talking about some sort of alliance. The Soviet Union believed and stated to United States policy makers that after Mao Zedong died in China that there would be civil war. About one week after President Johnson’s comments to Kosygin on China, on July 3, 1967, a soviet official commented to policy makers in the United States that “If this [civil war] does not result in an improvement… the Soviet Union should take direct action against China… and if and when the time comes to do something about China, the Soviet Union would expect the United States to help.”[33] Not only did United States policy makers see China as a major threat, but Soviet officials saw China as a big problem as well. It appeared to the Soviet Union that the Chinese threat was big enough that both superpowers had to agree to take on the threat together when the time came.
The question arises of just how serious these discussions of an alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States were during this time period. The answer is simple: the discussions most likely were not very serious, as they are mentioned only briefly in a handful of documents. Regardless of the fact the discussions were never very serious and that an alliance never did take place, the fact that brief discussions did take place showed that China was seen as a significant threat to both superpowers.
Other factors also cast doubt on the sincerity of the discussions. Throughout most of the Vietnam War, including 1966 and 1967, the Soviet Union sent supplies to the North Vietnamese through China to aid in the fight against the Americans. In fact, “between 1965 and 1968 a total of 179 trains comprising 5,750 cars of aid supplies, traveled along Chinese railroads to Vietnam.”[34] The amount of supplies sent to an enemy of the United States by the Soviet Union clearly shows that while discussions of an alliance took place, they were probably insincere. It is possible, but still unlikely, that the Soviet Union saw the Vietnam War as a completely different matter than the suggested alliance with the United States against China. Regardless of whatever the Soviet view was on this, however, the United States most likely saw all of the issues in Southeast Asia as stemming from the same problem: communism.
Although the Soviet leaders may not have ultimately intended to form an alliance with the leaders of the United States, it is possible that the leaders of the Soviet Union only wanted to bring the idea of an attack on China to the table and get American approval, or at least inform the United States what the Soviet Union was planning in order to avoid a direct war, which could end in nuclear strikes, with the United States. It is also possible, however, that the Soviet Union was simply tired of the old disputes with China and truly did expect the United States to help. Whatever the Soviet intentions were, they clearly wanted assurance that the United States would be willing to help, or at least not oppose Soviet action in China.
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